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1 
Using Empirical Research to Design Government 
Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of 
Citizens’ Roles in Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement 
David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of what role(s) citizens should play in governance is one of 
many outstanding, oft-debated questions about the appropriate structure 
and operation of our institutions of governance.1  Some commentators 
have argued strongly for increasing citizens’ opportunities to participate 
in government decision-making processes and to shape government 
outcomes.2  Others have taken considerably more skeptical positions 
                                                          
∗ Steven M. Goldstein Professor, Florida State University College of Law, and University 
Professor, Psychology Department, New York University, respectively.  Professors Beth Burch, Jon 
Klick, Wayne Logan, Greg Mitchell, and Joseph Sanders contributed very helpful comments on 
drafts of this article.  We also are grateful for the insightful suggestions we received in presenting the 
paper during the November 2007 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at NYU Law School.  
Stephanie Weisbrod, FSU College of Law ‘09, and Miriam Coles, FSU College of Law ‘08, 
provided excellent research assistance.  Judith Brodkin, Sarah Meyer, Jamila Gooden (all FSU 
College of Law ‘07), and Avital Mentovich (NYU graduate student in psychology) researched and 
compiled the lists of individuals and organizations we notified about our survey and helped us to 
track responses.  We are grateful to them for their hard work on this part of the project. 
 1. This question is addressed in the extensive literature about the legitimacy of the 
administrative state, among others.  See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for 
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1516–28 (1992).  For a few articles that focus 
particularly on the role of citizens in domestic governance in the United States, see, for example, 
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 546 (2000); Sidney 
A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic 
Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 689, 689–90 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the 
Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 439–40 (2003); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation 
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1672–73 (1975).  The appropriate role for 
citizens in governance is also the focus of an ongoing dialogue in the international arena.  See, e.g., 
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 104–30 (2004); Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries 
of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 274–78 (1997) 
(listing potential benefits and concerns associated with empowering non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) to participate in governance). 
 2. Some of the rationales offered for greater citizen involvement include enhancing 
government legitimacy and strengthening government performance.  See generally David Markell, 
“Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of 
Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005) (identifying and summarizing several such rationales). 
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about empowering citizens.3  The skeptics are concerned that citizen 
engagement will cause delays and otherwise lead to inefficient decision-
making,4 empower the already empowered and thereby do little to 
enhance legitimacy or more broadly-based decision-making,5 and elevate 
the voice of “squeaky wheels,” thus undermining the role expertise 
should, and otherwise would, play in agency decision-making.6 
Despite the concerns that skeptics and others have raised, the reality 
is that an enormous number and variety of citizen participation 
mechanisms exist in domestic and global governance.7  Further, in recent 
years, support for citizen engagement has made creation of new hybrid 
approaches intended to increase public involvement a regular feature of 
the governance landscape.8  Congress has been receptive and has adopted 
several policies in recent years intended to increase the role of citizens in 
governance.9  Government agencies have pursued the same tack.10 
                                                          
 3. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 23, 29 (1985) 
(“Participation has costs as well as benefits.”); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of 
Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 177 (1997) 
(stating “political theorists have often suggested that mass participation is not always a positive good 
for democracy”). 
 4. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 3, at 23 (noting the “participatory approach [] has serious 
limitations); Rossi, supra note 3, at 177–78 (“[T]he increase in mass participation itself may have 
adversely affected the quality of bureaucratic decisionmaking.”). 
 5. See MASHAW, supra note 3, at 24 (“[I]nterests that are substantially affected might, because 
of lack of resources or organization, fail to participate effectively in administrative forums.”); see 
also Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen Suits 
Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 
107–08 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (arguing that citizen participation 
through citizen suits is a tool for self-interested special interest groups). 
 6. See MASHAW, supra note 3, at 24 (“[C]ertain interests, because of their intensity, resources, 
and organization, will come to dominate even an open decision-making process.”).  Other concerns 
about NGOs and their participation in governance have been raised as well.  Accountability (or lack 
thereof) has been a prominent topic.  For treatment of the “dark side” of civil society, see ARIEL C. 
ARMONY, THE DUBIOUS LINK: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION 56–103 (2004). 
 7. For information on the field we study in this article—public involvement in environmental 
regulation—see, for example, U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF POLICY, ECONOMICS & INNOVATION, PUBLIC 
INVOLVEMENT POLICY OF THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/publicinvolvement/pdf/policy2003.pdf. 
 8. For example, Congress has encouraged negotiated rulemaking, and, more recently, has 
promoted e-rulemaking.  Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and 
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 943–47 (2006) [hereinafter Coglianese, Citizen Participation]; Cary 
Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation in Rulemaking, 1 J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 
33, 44–47 (2005) [hereinafter Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation].  For treatment of 
institutions in a variety of countries that provide for different levels of citizen participation, see 
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional Courts, 56 DUKE L.J. 953 
(2007).  For a brief survey of the increasing role of NGOs in international diplomacy, and the 
different types of NGOs, see Kal Raustiala & Natalie L. Bridgeman, Nonstate Actors in the Global 
Climate Regime, (UCLA Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research 
Paper No. 07-29), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028603. 
 9. See, e.g., Coglianese, Citizen Participation, supra note 8, at 943–45; Coglianese, Internet 
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Rhetoric in support of extensive and meaningful public engagement 
has not necessarily matched reality.  Public involvement is not something 
that can be taken for granted.  With even relatively simple forms of 
involvement in government processes (for example, voting in elections), 
encouraging public participation has proven difficult.11 
This project is animated by our desire to improve understanding of 
approaches that are likely to be effective in engendering enhanced public 
involvement.12  A key threshold issue involves determining the types of 
features that are likely to be effective in encouraging citizen involvement 
in governance.  That is, what types of government procedures and 
institutions will motivate citizens to come forward and be part of 
government decision-making?13  We are at an early stage of 
understanding concerning these issues.  As Professor Mariano-Florentino 
Cuéllar has noted, we still have a great deal to learn about both “actual 
                                                                                                                       
and Citizen Participation, supra note 8, at 42–43; Rossi, supra note 3, at 174–75.  The Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) provides an opportunity for citizen engagement that was intended to 
enhance government accountability and educate the citizenry, though some have claimed it is 
unnecessary while others have questioned its effectiveness.  See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom 
of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-06), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/abstract=1088413. 
 10. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, supra note 7, at 1.  On the other hand, national security concerns have 
contributed to recent initiatives to restrict access to certain types of information.  See, e.g., Michael 
Fitzpatrick, Code Orange: Will It Be Used to “End-Run” Federal Rulemaking Requirements?, 29 
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 11, 11 (2004) (suggesting that a variety of laws passed in response to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, implicate the availability of information to the public). 
 11. For example, only 42% of the voting-age population reported voting in the 2002 
congressional election; only 41.9% of eligible potential voters voted in the 1998 congressional 
elections, which was a record low.  JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY & KELLY HOLDER, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2002 14–15 (2004), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-552.pdf. 
 12. The question of the appropriate level of public involvement in governance is beyond the 
scope of this effort.  There are pros and cons to different levels of citizen participation in different 
governance structures.  See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 3.  Citizen confidence in processes may increase 
their willingness to defer to them.  This idea of voluntary deference is central to emerging models of 
self-regulation, but requires that the procedures used are experienced by those involved as 
appropriate and reasonable mechanisms.  See generally Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthagen, Moving 
Beyond Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health and 
the Environment, 19 LAW & POL’Y 415 (1997); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise 
and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 
(2002). 
 13. While our focus will be on environmental disputes, the issue of procedural acceptability 
comes up wherever there are hotly contested questions at issue.  In the past, one area that has been 
the focus of many efforts to identify acceptable procedures for resolving disputes is family court, 
which deals with divorce, child custody, and child support payments.  For a review of this topic, see 
PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN, CONSTRUCTIVE DIVORCE: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND SOCIOLEGAL 
REFORM (2005). 
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and potential public participation” in governance.14  Additional work is 
needed to refine and enhance our grasp of the nature of and reasons why 
citizens prefer different types of decision-making processes.15 
As scholars from various disciplines continue to wrestle with the 
issue of how to engage the public in government processes, our 
theoretical frame of reference lies in the psychology literature.  That 
literature pursues an ongoing exploration of the relative influence of 
“distributive justice” and “procedural justice” concerns in shaping citizen 
perspectives on different governance approaches.16  The concept of 
“distributive justice” focuses on the fairness or appropriateness of a 
procedure’s outcomes.17  In contrast, “procedural justice” involves the 
extent to which citizens value a process because of its procedural 
features.18 
The emerging body of work on the relative salience to citizens of 
distributive and procedural justice in different types of processes 
suggests that citizens value both types of justice.  As one of us has 
suggested: “[t]he expanded model [of social justice] recognizes that 
people are concerned about how decisions are made as well as about 
what those decisions are”—the distinction between substantive and 
                                                          
 14. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 
417 (2005).  It is also the case that a wide variety of factors may influence the extent of public 
involvement in any governance issue.  See, e.g., David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen 
Perspectives on Government Decision Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative 
State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 655 (2006) [hereinafter Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives] (“A 
potentially valuable step in fostering citizen participation in government decision making processes 
is to incorporate in these processes features that are important to citizens.  Processes that citizens 
value are likely to be processes that citizens use and that enhance citizen confidence in government, 
while processes with features that citizens find unsatisfactory are likely to be processes that do not 
engender meaningful citizen input . . . .”). 
 15. Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the 
Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND 
RESEARCH 27, 39 (Kenneth J. Gergen et al. eds., 1980).  Others have echoed the need for more 
research and analysis concerning other aspects of the issue of government operations and legitimacy.  
See, e.g., James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: 
Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 538, 555 (2003) (noting that “we 
have a long way to go in understanding the relationship between institutional performance and 
legitimacy” and that “only with more valid measures of institutional legitimacy can we make 
progress in unraveling the causal linkages between performance and legitimacy”). 
 16. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 85 (1997). 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 45–74. 
 18. Author Tom Tyler defines “procedural justice” as involving participants’ satisfaction with 
decision-making processes.  Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens 
to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 104 (1988) [hereinafter 
Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?]; see also Leventhal, supra note 15, at 39 (“[A] justice rule is 
defined as a belief that allocative procedures are fair when they satisfy certain criteria.  This type of 
justice rule is referred to as a procedural rule, to distinguish it from distribution rules . . . .”).  We 
acknowledge it is not always possible to completely disentangle the concepts of distributive justice 
and procedural justice and that is the case for our results. 
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procedural justice.19  This work has, in addition, begun to shed light on 
the relative importance of procedural and distributive justice to citizens 
as well as why they find these concepts significant.20  Nevertheless, 
Professor Cuéllar’s caution that we still have much to learn certainly 
continues to hold true.  With respect to our understanding of citizen 
perspectives on the desirability of different governance mechanisms from 
a use standpoint, it is especially true, since most of the existing research 
on distributive and procedural justice only focuses upon people’s 
willingness to accept decisions resulting from legal procedures.21 
Our purpose in this article is to advance understanding of how 
citizens perceive and value different types of government processes that 
are intended to encourage or facilitate citizen involvement.  Our view is 
that, when dealing with government decision-making processes that seek 
to encourage citizen involvement, it is valuable to understand which 
types of processes citizens favor and, further, the particular features of 
processes that citizens believe are especially worthwhile.  Our project, 
through what we refer to as an empirical governance approach, is 
intended to advance the state of knowledge in both areas.22 
Part II of this Article describes the design of our project, particularly 
our focus on mechanisms for citizens to participate in governance in the 
environmental-enforcement arena.  Part III summarizes the methodology 
we used in developing our questionnaire for citizens interested in this 
field of governance.  Part IV focuses on the questionnaire respondents’ 
views concerning different types of procedures available to citizens 
interested in participating in promoting environmental compliance.  Part 
V addresses respondents’ views concerning the different features of these 
mechanisms.  Part VI focuses in particular on respondents’ perspectives 
regarding two mechanisms available to citizens: citizen suits under the 
environmental laws, and the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation’s (CEC’s) citizen submissions process.  Part VII, among 
                                                          
 19. TYLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 75. 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 85, 100 (suggesting that procedural justice may be even more important than 
distributive justice in some contexts). 
 21. Willingness to use a procedure and willingness to defer to an outcome from it are related, 
but different, issues.  See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (examining both people’s pre-procedure preferences concerning 
how their dispute should be resolved and their post-evaluations of the decisions reached).  More 
recently, Tom R. Tyler et al., The Two Psychologies of Conflict Resolution: Differing Antecedents of 
Pre-Experience Choices and Post-Experience Evaluations, in 2 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP 
RELATIONS 99–118 (1999), directly compared pre- and post-experience evaluations of procedures. 
 22. Commentators have identified a number of reasons why citizen involvement is, or may be, 
beneficial.  One outstanding question concerns the potential relationship between the hoped-for 
benefits of participation and the nature of citizens’ views about different process features. 
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other things, concludes by offering a simplified matrix approach for 
designing suitable procedures when a goal is to engage citizens. 
II. CITIZEN PREFERENCES AND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
Our initial research project focused on citizen opportunities to 
participate in environmental enforcement and compliance efforts in the 
United States.23  We identified eleven types of opportunities for citizens 
in the United States to participate in environmental enforcement and 
compliance.24  These opportunities ranged from mechanisms we 
anticipate are relatively common knowledge in the environmental field 
(e.g., citizen suit provisions that exist under the major environmental 
statutes),25 to mechanisms with which many citizens and others may have 
had little if any contact (e.g., the opportunity to file petitions with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to withdraw a State’s 
authorization to implement a regulatory program because of deficiencies 
in the State’s enforcement performance).26 
We asked respondents a series of questions about each of these 
opportunities for citizens to participate in governance to encourage 
compliance with the environmental laws.27  In the initial section of the 
questionnaire we asked for basic information about people’s preferences 
for and overall levels of satisfaction with these extant mechanisms 
available to citizens.  For example, we asked respondents to rank the 
                                                          
 23. Author David Markell presented this effort during the Fall 2006 International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) conference held at Pace Law School and also discussed it during an 
August 2007 meeting of the Organization of American States Sustainable Development 
Environmental Law Advisory Group.  Several NGOs, professors, and others expressed interest in 
our pursuing similar work concerning enforcement practices in a significant number of other 
countries.  Our plan at this point is to explore these opportunities following completion of this initial 
study of practices in the United States.  Further, we are currently undertaking a similar study 
involving citizen participation processes in the land use arena, with a particular focus on growth 
management. 
 24. See infra appended Tables 1–2. 
 25. Citizen suit provisions have been included in the major environmental statutes for more 
than thirty years since their inception in the early 1970s.  They have been used frequently during that 
period.  For example, in a 2003 article, Professor Jim May indicates that since 1995, citizens have 
submitted more than 4500 notices of intent to file citizen suits and, on average, have filed about one 
lawsuit per week.  James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 4, 30 (2003).  The citizen suit provisions for three of the major federal 
environmental regulatory statutes are set forth in Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000); and Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
7604 (2000). 
 26. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.22–.23 (2007) (authorizing citizens to file such petitions for 
withdrawal of State RCRA authorization).  Far fewer such petitions have been filed. 
 27. See infra appended Tables 1–4.  See infra Part III for a summary of our methodology. 
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eleven mechanisms in order of preference.28  In addition, we asked them 
to assign a value to the opportunities in an absolute sense—in terms of 
how helpful any of the opportunities are likely to be in enabling 
respondents to achieve their goals.  Our goal in this section of the 
questionnaire was to understand respondents’ preferences for different 
procedures and to assess respondents’ views concerning the likely 
efficacy of these procedures in helping them to achieve their goals. 
In the next part of the questionnaire, we sought to unpack the reasons 
why citizens favor one type of opportunity to participate in enforcement 
or compliance work over another.  Based in part on the procedural and 
distributive justice literature,29 we identified twenty-two features of 
decision-making processes and asked respondents about the importance 
of each such feature.  Features included the opportunity to provide 
written comments to decision makers, the availability of funding support 
for participation, the neutrality of the decision-making entity, and several 
others.  Different extant processes available to citizens in the 
enforcement arena included different combinations of these features.  
Here we sought to understand why a procedure is desirable. 
In addition to asking citizens about their preferences for particular 
features of government decision-making processes in the abstract, we 
focused specific attention on two such processes in the environmental 
enforcement arena: citizen suits available under the environmental laws 
against alleged violators,30 and the CEC’s citizen submissions process, 
which allows citizens in the United States to file complaints in which 
they allege the government is failing to effectively enforce one or more 
environmental laws.31  Viewed through the lens of the procedural and 
                                                          
 28. As part of this inquiry, we ask whether a respondent is familiar with each mechanism, to 
develop a sense of the role of familiarity in forming preferences. 
 29. E.g., Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?, supra note 18, at 103–35. 
 30. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 1365(a)(1); Clean Air Act § 7604(a)(1), (3); Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act § 6972(a)(1). 
 31. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. XIV, 
1993, http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree/naaec/index.cfm?varlan=english 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2008) [hereinafter NAAEC].  For an overview of the CEC citizen submissions 
process, see, for example, David L. Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s 
Citizen Submission Process, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 545 (2000) [hereinafter Markell, 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation].  For a broader review of the CEC, see GREENING 
NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 256–57 (David 
L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003) and specifically David L. Markell, The CEC Citizen 
Submissions Process: On or Off Course?, in GREENING NAFTA, supra, at 274–98.  See also John H. 
Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The Submissions 
Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 32 (2001); David L. 
Markell, Governance of International Institutions: A Review of the North American Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen Submissions Process, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 759 
(2005) [hereinafter Markell, Governance of International Institutions]. 
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distributive justice literatures, it is clear these procedures vary 
significantly, as explained below. 
Citizen suits are probably the best known vehicle for citizens to 
participate in environmental enforcement and compliance work.32  Each 
of the major environmental regulatory statutes creates a cause of action 
for citizens,33 allowing citizens with standing to bring suit in federal 
district court and claim a regulated party is operating in violation of one 
or more federal environmental laws.34  Citizens have extensive rights of 
participation in such cases.  They may pursue discovery in order to 
develop a better understanding of regulated party and government 
regulators’ performance.35  They may also participate actively in the trial 
phase of litigation by offering witnesses, cross-examining hostile 
witnesses, and engaging in the other features of conventional trial 
practice.36  Further, citizens may seek wide-ranging relief, including 
punitive civil sanctions that can amount to as much as $32,500 per day 
per violation for each day a violation continues,37 remedial relief to 
require a violator to cease its violations and, in some cases, to repair 
injury it has caused.38  Another key feature of citizen suit mechanisms in 
the federal environmental laws is that substantially prevailing citizens 
may recover attorneys’ fees.39 
The CEC’s citizen submissions process is a much more recent 
addition to the menu of citizens’ options for influencing environmental 
enforcement.  Its features differ significantly from the citizen suit 
                                                          
 32. A significant amount of scholarship exists on citizen suits.  See, e.g., Symposium, 
Environmental Citizen Suits at Thirtysomething: A Celebration & Summit, Part I, 10 WIDENER L. 
REV. 1 (2003); Symposium, Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21st Century: From 
Lujan to Laidlaw and Beyond, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (2001). 
 33. See supra note 30. 
 34. The elements of such causes of action vary depending on the statute.  See Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64–65 (1987) (holding that a citizen 
must make a good faith allegation that a party is operating in violation of the Clean Water Act and 
comparing the Act’s jurisdictional requirement with the more flexible requirement in RCRA). 
 35. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (rules concerning discovery). 
 36. See id. at 38–53. 
 37. 40 C.F.R. § 19.4, tbl. 1 (2007).  Penalties in citizen suits go to the U.S. Treasury.  See, e.g., 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998). 
38.  See David Markell, Is There a Possible Role for Regulatory Enforcement in the Effort to 
Value, Protect, and Restore Ecosystem Services?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 549, 554, 558, 572–
74 (2007). 
 39. The test for recovering attorneys’ fees depends on the statute.  See Buckhannon Bd. & Care 
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602–03 (2001) (discussing the 
“American Rule” and the “catalyst theory”); see also Amigos Bravos v. EPA, 324 F.3d 1166, 1168 
(10th Cir. 2003) (discussing the “catalyst theory” under the Clean Water Act); Sierra Club v. EPA, 
322 F.3d 718, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing recovery of attorneys’ fees under the Clean Air Act); 
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 307 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(discussing fee-shifting provisions under the Endangered Species Act). 
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mechanism summarized in the preceding paragraph.  Citizen access to 
this mechanism is intended to be easier than citizen access to initiate a 
citizen suit in the courts.  Standing, for example, is not supposed to be a 
significant hurdle to citizen participation in the CEC process.40  Further, 
the CEC process is intended to allow citizens to raise concerns about 
environmental enforcement without having to invest significant 
resources of the sort sometimes needed to press litigation.  Rather than 
emulate the civil litigation’s discovery and litigation process—which can 
be quite time-consuming and expensive for citizens—the CEC citizen 
submissions process invests the CEC Secretariat with responsibility for 
administration of the process after a citizen complaint is filed.41  The 
Secretariat administers its own investigative and fact-gathering process 
to pursue citizen concerns about non-compliance and ineffectual 
enforcement practices.42  The trade off for citizens is that in some 
respects the CEC process provides much more limited opportunities for 
participation than traditional civil litigation.  Citizens have little, if any, 
ability to confront or obtain information from the offending entity whose 
activities citizens believe are flawed.43  Similarly, citizens’ rights to 
interact with the “decision maker” (in this process, the CEC Secretariat 
and the CEC Council, depending on the stage of the process) are much 
more limited than in civil litigation.44 
Similarly, the possible outcomes of the CEC process differ 
significantly from possible outcomes of citizen suits.  For the former, the 
end result is the “reflexive” approach of spotlighting perceived 
inadequate performance with the hope that the attention will motivate 
improvements.45  Penalties and injunctive relief are not available under 
                                                          
 40. The CEC is prepared to consider submissions from citizens without first requiring that 
citizens demonstrate harm of the sort that may be required for initiation of a citizen suit.  On the 
other hand, there are limitations in the CEC process that do not exist in the citizen suit arena.  See, 
e.g., NAAEC, supra note 31, art. 14(3)(a)(ii); see also Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives, 
supra note 14, at 654–55. 
 41. See generally NAAEC, supra note 31, art. 14 (outlining the citizen submission process). 
 42. See id. art. 15(4). 
 43. There is no opportunity for any form of discovery.  Markell, Understanding Citizen 
Perspectives, supra note 14, at 686.  Thus, FOIA is the primary tool available to citizens to obtain 
information.  See generally The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 44. Markell, Commission for Environmental Cooperation, supra note 31, at 550–63.  For 
example, there is no opportunity for hearings.  Id. at 562–63. 
 45. A. Dan Tarlock & John E. Thorson, Coordinating Land and Water Use in the San Pedro 
River Basin: What Role for the CEO?, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 31, at 217, 231 (discussing 
“reflexive approaches”); see also Eric Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 
1278 (1995) (discussing how the EPA’s “new policy’s emphasis on ‘self-policing’ and ‘self-
disclosure’ fits with an emerging model of reflexive environmental regulation”). 
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the CEC process.46  Finally, while the CEC Secretariat is intended to do 
much of the “heavy lifting” in investigating citizen complaints, there is 
no provision for attorneys’ fees or other support for citizen engagement 
in the process.47 
In sum, the citizen suits available under the major federal 
environmental laws and the citizen submission process created under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) environmental side 
agreement represent very different approaches to engaging citizens in 
environmental enforcement.  Access to the CEC process differs 
significantly from access to traditional citizen suit mechanisms; the 
nature of the processes and opportunities for financial assistance differ 
significantly, and the end results vary dramatically. 
In theory, one procedure is intended to be a “traditional” adversary 
process in which citizens are actively involved throughout, operating 
before an independent tribunal with considerable authority to engage in 
fact-finding, authorize fact-finding by citizens, and impose appropriate 
relief.  The other is intended to be more of a cooperative process in 
which citizens operate in a “fire alarm” capacity, and which 
circumscribes the tribunal’s authority to facilitate and conduct fact-
finding or to impose relief.48 
There is already a considerable body of commentary about these 
mechanisms.  With respect to citizen suits, for example, scholars and 
others have opined at great length about the efficacy of such suits, and 
the importance of different features.49  Concerns about gaining access to 
the courts to raise concerns have been a recurring theme.50  Another 
significant issue has been the costs of litigation and the possibilities of 
recovering fees.51  Similarly, several commentators have written about 
                                                          
 46. Rather, NAAEC Article 15 merely provides for the development and possible publication 
of a factual record.  See NAAEC, supra note 31, art. 15(2). 
 47. See generally id. arts. 14–15 (regarding submissions on enforcement matters and factual 
records). 
 48. Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC, in GREENING 
NAFTA, supra note 31, at 256, 264 (discussing “fire alarms”).  Substantively, the focus of the two 
processes differs as well.  Citizen suits tend to focus on particular violations, while the CEC process 
potentially has a broader scope.  See Markell, Governance of International Institutions, supra note 
31, at 791.  Further, while citizen suits focus on alleged violator activity, the CEC process focuses on 
government enforcement performance.  See Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives, supra 
note 14, at 662. 
 49. See, e.g., Jim Hecker, The Difficulty of Citizen Enforcement of the Clean Air Act, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 303, 304–05 (2004); Patrick Parenteau, Citizen Suits Under the Endangered 
Species Act: Survival of the Fittest, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 321, 322 (2004). 
 50. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. 
REV. 897, 915 (2006). 
 51. See, e.g., ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 
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the effectiveness of the CEC citizen submissions process and about the 
key features that account for its success (or lack thereof).52  Citizens have 
raised concerns about the lack of transparency in the process, for 
example.53  Another concern is that the “playing field” has not been level 
because the CEC Council, which exercises an integral role in 
implementing the process, has not been neutral in performing its 
responsibilities.54  Other concerns have been raised about the quantity 
and quality of opportunities for citizens to participate in the process, and 
about the adequacy of the remedial side of the process.55 
Our empirical governance approach is intended to build on, and 
begin to test, the extant literature on enforcement mechanisms that allow 
for citizen involvement, including citizen suits and the CEC’s citizen 
submissions process.  In particular, the project is intended to serve as a 
model for how to develop empirical information about at least two 
issues: (1) the nature of citizen preferences for different types of 
opportunities to participate in environmental enforcement and 
compliance-related activities, and (2) the reasons why citizens prefer 
some mechanisms to others—in particular, the value citizens attach to 
specific features of participation opportunities.  More generally, as noted 
above, our argument is that many areas of the legal system could 
potentially benefit from the development of a framework through which 
publicly desirable procedures could be designed.  It is often the case that, 
for example, irrespective of whether we are discussing environmental 
conflicts or disputes in small claims court, the public is resistant to 
participating in governance or in deferring to the decisions governance 
institutions make.  We would benefit in such settings from better 
information about what dispute resolution processes are desirable in the 
                                                                                                                       
1037 n.8 (5th ed. 2007). 
 52. Randy Christensen, The Citizen Submission Process Under NAFTA: Observations after 10 
Years, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 165 (2004) (noting that the citizen submission process has been an 
effective means of “highlighting environmental problems, compelling governments to engage in 
debates, and bringing about positive environmental change through independent factual 
investigations”); Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives, supra note 14, at 651 (2006); 
Gustavo Alanís Ortega, Public Participation within NAFTA’s Environmental Agreement: The 
Mexican Experience, in LINKING TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL COHESION: NAFTA 
EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 183–86 (John J. Kirton and Virginia W. Maclaren eds., 2002); 
Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 & 15 of the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
415, 416–17 (2004). 
 53. Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives, supra note 14, at 688–91. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Other mechanisms in addition to citizen suits and the CEC process have been the subject of 
commentary as well.  See, e.g., Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environmental Justice: Turning 
Polluters into “Good Neighbors” Through Collaborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 
180–88 (2002) (discussing Good Neighbor Agreements). 
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eyes of both the disputants and the public more generally.  We offer this 
initial article in order to share our objectives, to solicit feedback on the 
entire project, and, hopefully, to stimulate similar efforts to embrace the 
legal academy’s call to greater recourse for empirical work in order to 
inform review and development of public policy.56 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A wide variety of people involved in environmental litigation were 
asked via e-mail to participate in this study by completing our 
questionnaire.57  Our target group was environmental activists because 
this is a group likely to be interested in participating in environmental 
enforcement by using one or more of the mechanisms we identified.58  
We made a systematic effort to identify individuals (lawyers and clients) 
who had used the different mechanisms we listed.  For citizen suits under 
the environmental laws, for example, we identified and tried to contact 
all plaintiffs and lawyers who between January 1, 2004, and March 13, 
2006, filed citizen suits against alleged violators of the Clean Water Act, 
the Clean Air Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as 
well as those plaintiffs and lawyers who filed lawsuits against the 
government during that time period under one or more of these laws for 
alleged failure to effectively enforce the provisions of the statute(s) in 
question.59  We identified and sought to contact all U.S. non-
                                                          
 56. The legal academy has highlighted the importance of empirical work as an important tool to 
a greater understanding of how society works and of how to refine it so that it works better.  For 
example, the 2006 Association of American Law Schools (AALS) annual meeting focused on 
empirical scholarship.  See Ass’n of Am. Law Sch. Annual Meeting, http://www.aals.org/am2006 
/theme.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2008). 
 57. We also contacted several individuals by telephone who had used one or more of the 
mechanisms we asked about. 
 58. Our choice of respondents highlights a broader question, notably, whose views are relevant 
to questions concerning governance structure?  Is it the general public?  Or is it the groups that are 
most likely to actually participate, e.g., activists?  As noted in the text, in this initial effort we 
focused on environmental activists because we believed they were likely to participate in the 
procedures we identified and also because our focus in this project is on use of the government 
processes.  For some purposes, investigating the views of broader population cross-sections is 
obviously appropriate.  This issue is an important one for methodological design. 
 59. Two databases were used to conduct this search: (1) Westlaw and (2) Public Access to 
Court Electronic Records (PACER).  PACER is an electronic service that allows users to search case 
and docket information from federal appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts, and from the U.S. 
Party/Case Index.  Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, What is PACER?, 
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).  The PACER System offers 
electronic access to case dockets to retrieve information such as a listing of all parties and 
participants, the nature of the suit, and the types of documents filed for each case.  Id.  PACER has a 
list of codes that correspond to different types of lawsuits.  Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 
PACER Frequently Asked Questions, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited Oct. 4, 
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governmental organizations (NGOs) and NGO attorneys that have filed 
submissions with the CEC process.60  Similarly, through a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request to EPA we obtained a list of all entities 
that have filed petitions to withdraw state authorization.  We sought to 
contact each of these.61 
To participate in the study, respondents logged into a web-based 
survey site62 and completed a questionnaire.  We received thirty 
responses.  To learn more about our respondents, we asked them to 
classify themselves in two ways.  First, they indicated their political 
party affiliation, ranging from strongly Republican (7) to strongly 
Democratic (1).63  The mean was 2.08, suggesting that most respondents 
                                                                                                                       
2008).  Suits primarily concerned with environmental issues are tagged with code 893.  
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER Nature of Suit Glossary, 
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/natsuit.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).  A search was conducted for all 
civil suits filed between January 1, 2004, and March 13, 2006, that had code 893.  This returned over 
1000 cases.  Because PACER does not have the capability to further restrict the search, the docket 
for each case was viewed and the first complaint downloaded to ascertain whether the suit was filed 
pursuant to one of the statutes in question. 
A search on Westlaw was also conducted.  Westlaw allows for the input of search terms as a 
means to restrict the results returned in a docket and/or pleadings search.  The search terms used 
were: “33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1)” “42 U.S.C. 7604(a)(1)” “42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)” “42 U.S.C. 
7604(a)(3)” “42 U.S.C. 7604(a)(2)” “33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(2)” and “42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(2).”  These are 
the citations for the citizen suit provisions of the statutes in question.  Because Westlaw allowed for 
the use of more restrictive search terms, the citizen suit information was compiled using this 
database.  After we completed this part of the task, we again consulted PACER to locate any civil 
suits meeting the search criteria that could not be found on Westlaw. 
The mailing address and e-mail address for each attorney were located on Westlaw or PACER if 
available in those databases.  For each attorney who did not have an e-mail address available on 
Westlaw or PACER, a Google search was conducted to locate the Web site of the law firm or 
organization of those attorneys.  If available, the e-mail address for the attorney was taken from the 
Web site.  E-mail addresses for the plaintiffs were not available on either Westlaw or PACER.  A 
Google search was conducted to locate the Web site of each institutional or organizational plaintiff.  
If available, the e-mail address for each institution or organization was taken from the Web site.  No 
search was conducted for plaintiffs listed as individuals. 
Not all courts make their information available for the PACER U.S. Party/Case Index.  
Additionally, not all of the cases had pleadings that were available for viewing on either Westlaw or 
PACER.  These two circumstances placed limitations on the number of citizen suits from which the 
plaintiff and attorney information could be drawn. 
 60. We obtained this information from www.cec.org, the CEC Web site. 
 61. For a list of these entities, see Letter from Marilyn J. Kuray, Attorney-Advisor, Office of 
Gen. Counsel, Cross-Cutting Issues Law Office, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to David Markell (Mar. 
29, 2005), at 1–16 (on file with authors).  In addition to these specific groups, we sought to reach all 
of the law school environmental clinics who represent public interest groups by sending an e-mail to 
members of the clinic listserve notifying them of the survey and requesting they complete it.  We 
also contacted representatives of several national environmental groups (National Resources Defense 
Counsel, the Sierra Club, etc.) and requested that they complete the survey and notify their 
colleagues of the opportunity to do so. 
 62. We used the Create Survey Web site, http://www.createsurvey.com (last visited Oct. 4, 
2008). 
 63. David Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Survey, Stakeholder Input into Environmental Regulation 
(Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.createsurvey.com/cgi-bin/pollfrm?s=36069&m=zaclZV (last visited 
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were Democratic.64  An examination of the responses showed 89% of the 
respondents were Democratic, 12% moderate.65  Similarly, respondents 
classified themselves as extremely conservative (7) to extremely liberal 
(1).66  The mean was 2.41, with 78% of respondents indicating they were 
liberal, 18% indicating they were moderate, and 4% indicating they were 
conservative.67 
The questionnaire also included an eight-item trust-in-government 
scale.  The items were: “You can usually trust the government to do what 
is right”; “You are generally satisfied with the actions of the government 
in the area of environmental regulation”; “You feel that the government 
is run for the benefit of all the people”; “If you took a complaint over 
environmental policy to the government, your views would be given 
attention”; “People like yourself have considerable influence over 
government decisions about environmental policy”; “There is not much 
about our government that you feel proud of (reverse scored)”; “The 
government is too strongly influenced by special interests looking out for 
themselves (reverse scored)”; and “You are often frustrated by the 
actions of government agencies (reverse scored).”68  The item responses 
ranged from disagree strongly (1) to agree strongly (6).69  The overall 
scale scores ranged from one to six, with high scores indicating a high 
level of trust.  The mean was 2.44 (standard deviation = 0.77; alpha = 
0.83), reflecting limited trust and confidence in government.70 
Respondents also indicated their confidence in social institutions on 
a scale ranging from low confidence (1) to high confidence (6).  They 
first indicated their confidence in the people running eight institutions: 
the American business community, the executive branch, the press, the 
Supreme Court, the Congress, regulatory agencies of the government, 
non-governmental agencies, and state governments.71  They then rated 
how frequently leaders of these same institutions try to do what is right 
                                                                                                                       
Sept. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Survey]. 
 64. Stakeholder Input into Environmental Regulation: Survey Results (2007) (on file with 
authors) [hereinafter Survey Results]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Survey, supra note 63. 
 67. See Survey Results, supra note 64. 
 68. See Survey, supra note 63. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Survey Results, supra note 64.  Coefficient alpha is a term used by psychologists to 
refer to the degree to which the items in a scale belong together.  Essentially, it reflects the average 
intercorrelation among items.  Higher numbers indicate higher intercorrelation and a better scale.  
Numbers above 0.80 are excellent and numbers above 0.60 are reasonable.  See N.C. State Univ., 
Scales and Standard Measures, http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/standard.htm (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2008). 
 71. See Survey, supra note 63. 
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for all the people in their communities, using a scale ranging from never 
(1) to always (6).72  The mean for the sixteen-item scale was 3.11 
(standard deviation = 0.61; alpha = 0.85).73  Respondents had much more 
confidence in the people running NGOs than was the case for other 
institutions. 
We also asked respondents how important they think it is to have a 
procedure available in situations involving violations of the 
environmental laws so that people can use it (1 = very unimportant; 6 = 
very important).74  The results of this analysis are shown in appended 
Table 1.75  Respondents indicated that all of the mechanisms we listed 
should be available and that people are most likely to believe traditional 
legal mechanisms should be available.76  Those include the ability to file 
a citizen lawsuit (mean = 5.89), to file a citizen suit against the 
government (mean = 5.74), and to file a common law action (mean = 
5.42).77 
In short, this set of responses allows us to begin examining 
preferences among those who are likely to initiate or participate in 
environmental enforcement litigation or other similar actions—
environmental activists and the attorneys who represent them.  Overall, 
these results indicate that those completing the questionnaire are 
generally Democratic and liberal, having low levels of trust and 
confidence in government and other social institutions; the marked 
exception being NGOs (the mean trust in NGOs was 3.93, versus an 
average of 2.90 for other institutions on a scale ranging from 1 to 6, with 
high scores indicating more trust).78  Further, they strongly support a 
legal system that affords citizens significant opportunities to participate 
in promoting compliance with the environmental laws.79 
It is obviously possible that a random cross-section of the population 
would have provided very different responses if we had targeted such a 
group.  Our findings should be considered with this limitation in mind.  
Thus, for example, a policy maker interested in designing a process  
 
                                                          
 72. Id. 
 73. See Survey Results, supra note 64. 
 74. See Survey, supra note 63. 
 75. See infra appended Table 1.  In appended Table 1, a scale of 1 to 6 is used.  Each 
respondent is asked to rate the desirability of having each of the eleven procedures available for 
people to use. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Survey Results, supra note 64. 
 79. Id. 
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intended to appeal to the general population might well use a different 
methodology to select questionnaire recipients.80 
Further, even among Environmental NGOs, it has been theorized that 
the type of organization in which a person works may influence that 
person’s views concerning different issues.  For example, a group’s 
funding sources may be very relevant to its views concerning the 
importance of an attorneys’ fees recovery provision in a participation 
process.81  A follow-up, expanded research effort would seek to obtain 
more nuanced information of this sort. 
IV. WHAT PROCEDURES DO PEOPLE SAY THEY ARE LIKELY TO USE TO 
RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES? 
People completing the questionnaire were asked to indicate their 
likelihood of using each of eleven procedures to resolve two types of 
environmental disputes.  The first type of dispute is one in which “a 
single party is violating its environmental obligations.”82  The second 
type of dispute involves a situation in which “widespread violations are 
occurring at many locations and are being committed by many 
individuals or companies, e.g., several companies are violating their 
Clean Water Act permitting obligations.”83 
These procedures are as follows: 
(1)  File a citizen suit against the violator based upon statutory law. 
(2)  Participate in a government enforcement action. 
(3)  File a common law cause of action. 
(4)  File a submission with the CEC. 
(5)  File a citizen suit against the government. 
(6)  Raise concerns with the EPA’s Office of Inspector General. 
(7)  Petition the EPA to withdraw state authorization. 
(8)  Informal contact with the violator. 
                                                          
 80. See supra note 58.  The idea that a procedure should be acceptable to people irrespective of 
ideology, ethnicity, or other characteristics, (e.g., wealth), has been articulated in the literature on 
dispute resolution.  See, e.g., E. Allan Lind, Yuen J. Huo & Tom R. Tyler, . . . And Justice for All: 
Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
269 (1994); Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking 
Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 809 (1994); Tom R. Tyler, 
Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 983 (2000). 
 81. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis 
for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000). 
 82. See Survey, supra note 63. 
 83. Id. 
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(9)  Informal contact with the government. 
(10)  Pursue shaming opportunities, such as notifying the media. 
(11)  Take some other type of action.84 
A. Results 
Appended Table 2 indicates the likelihood that respondents think 
they would use any of these eleven procedures.85  In the case of an 
individual violation, the primary procedure respondents indicated they 
would use is filing a citizen lawsuit (mean = 4.93).86  With widespread 
violations, respondents indicated they would be most likely to use 
shaming mechanisms (mean = 4.39).87  These initial findings suggest that 
respondents generally view lawsuits as the key mechanism they would 
use to respond to wrongdoing in single violation situations.  In contrast, 
they are more likely to pursue a shaming opportunity and less likely to 
file a lawsuit in the widespread violation context.88 
A second question respondents were asked is whether any of the 
actions identified would allow them to achieve their goals in the 
situation.  Respondents were given a six-point scale on which they noted 
the likelihood that at least one of the actions listed would allow them to 
achieve their goals (very unlikely; unlikely; somewhat unlikely; 
somewhat likely; likely; very likely).89  Responses were collapsed into 
two groups: likely and unlikely.  In the case of the single violator, 71% 
indicated at least one was likely to be effective.90  With multiple 
violators, 68% indicated at least one was likely to be effective.91 
B. Implications 
It is interesting that respondents identified different process 
preferences depending on the nature of the non-compliance involved.  
                                                          
 84. See infra appended Table 1. 
 85. See infra appended Table 2.  Appended Table 1, infra, shows the eleven procedures 
outlined.  For each procedure, respondents were asked whether they were familiar with it.  See 
Survey, supra note 63.  Among those who said “yes,” the average likelihood of using each procedure 
is determined separately for single and widespread violations.  Higher numbers indicate a greater 
likelihood of using the procedure. 
 86. See infra appended Table 2. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Survey, supra note 63. 
 90. See Survey Results, supra note 64. 
 91. Id. 
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Respondents were more likely to view citizen litigation as desirable for 
single violations.92  With widespread violations, people preferred going 
outside the legal system and using shaming mechanisms.93 
Further research would be useful to determine why citizen activists 
may prefer different mechanisms depending on the context.  We 
speculate that at least part of the answer may be that respondents are 
more confident in the likely efficacy of citizen lawsuits in the single 
violator situation than in the multiple violator context.  But, it would be 
worth further investigation to assess whether the difference is based 
primarily or entirely on concerns related to distributive justice (e.g., the 
likelihood of “success” anticipated in using different mechanisms in 
different contexts) or whether procedural justice issues play a role in the 
differing preferences as well.  Further, if procedural justice issues are 
relevant, there is the question of which aspects of procedural justice are 
most salient.94  As we point out infra,95 we found through other questions 
that procedural justice features vary in their salience to citizens 
depending on the process involved. 
Similarly, our findings raise a question concerning the role of 
familiarity in shaping the respondents’ preferences.  Approximately 80% 
of those who completed the questionnaire indicated they are familiar 
with the traditional legal mechanism of the lawsuit because they have 
personally been involved in using that procedure in the past, and suggest 
they would respond to a legal problem by using that mechanism in the 
future.96  They are less accustomed to using other procedures, such as the 
CEC procedure.97  In fact, almost none of the respondents had any 
personal experience with the CEC procedure, which is not surprising 
given that it is a new and not widely used procedure.98  One possible 
explanation for the relative popularity of citizen suits that is consistent 
with our findings is that people prefer procedures with which they have 
personal experience.99  More research would be needed to test the role of 
                                                          
 92. See infra appended Table 2. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See infra Part VI. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Survey Results, supra note 64. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Considerable research in psychology supports the argument that people are more likely to 
like those aspects of social situations with which they are familiar.  See, e.g., Robert B. Zajonc, 
Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPH SUPP., pt. 2, 
1 (1968) (offering a hypothesis that repeated exposure to a stimulus object enhances an individual’s 
attitude toward it).  Familiarity is obviously not necessarily the only reason lawsuits are preferred.  
More work, along the lines discussed in Parts V and VI, will help shed light on the role of familiarity 
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familiarity in respondents’ preferences among the procedures we 
identified. 
Also of interest are the findings concerning expectations of 
effectiveness of any of the processes in the two situations we studied.  
The suggestion that citizens may be less sanguine about the likely 
efficacy of existing legal or other mechanisms to address situations 
involving multiple violators seemingly raises questions about the 
efficacy of such mechanisms to deal with potentially larger non-
compliance situations—for example, whether there is a gap, unintended 
or not, in our legal mechanisms for addressing non-compliance.100 
Somewhat related, approximately 30% of those interviewed do not 
think any of the existing mechanisms will enable them to achieve their 
goals.101  This suggests more research is needed regarding their 
normative and other goals and the relationship of those goals to societal 
interests and priorities.  In this study, we did not ask people what their 
goals were, only whether they could achieve them within the existing 
structure. 
V. WHAT ARE THE FEATURES OF A DESIRABLE PROCEDURE? 
The ratings indicate that respondents varied in the degree in which 
they regarded different procedures as being procedures they would use 
and/or as procedures they felt should be available for others to use.  We 
were interested in understanding why respondents made these 
desirability ratings. 
To examine why procedures were viewed as desirable, we asked 
respondents to indicate how important different procedural features were 
to the desirability of those procedures.  The scale used was (1) very 
unimportant to (6) very important.  Ratings for seventeen attributes are 
presented in appended Table 3.102  Those attributes are grouped into six 
                                                                                                                       
compared to other factors.  We asked respondents about their overall familiarity with the processes 
we were studying in the specific context of each of the fact patterns we were asking about.  Thus, it 
is possible that respondents’ greater familiarity with lawsuits in the individual violator situation may 
have affected their preferences. 
 100. In addition to questions concerning the utility or efficacy of extant legal mechanisms in 
addressing non-compliance in different situations, questions exist concerning optimal levels of 
compliance and enforcement.  See, e.g., David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based 
Enforcement in a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2000).  Similarly, there are questions regarding optimal 
availability of lawsuits and other mechanisms in light of different goals and contextual realities, such 
as enhancing legitimacy and resource constraints. 
 101. See Survey Results, supra note 64. 
 102. See infra appended Table 3.  People were asked about twenty-two attributes, seventeen of 
which fit into traditional procedural justice categories.  Appended Table 3 shows two types of 
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procedural clusters: overall procedural justice, neutrality, trust, respect, 
voice, and control over the outcome.103  Overall average scores are 
presented for the clusters.104 
A. Results 
One reason people might view a procedure as desirable is that it 
allows them to achieve their outcome goals.  Respondents indicated that 
the ability to achieve their outcome goals was one important aspect of a 
procedure (mean = 5.51).105  In particular, people wanted to have an 
opportunity to change behavior they objected to (mean = 5.71).106 
Interestingly, people also valued other elements of procedures 
besides the outcome they would deliver.  In particular, people put weight 
on having neutral procedures (mean = 5.58).107  This included procedures 
that would lead to factually-based decisions (mean = 5.88); procedures 
that would lead to legally appropriate outcomes (mean = 5.64); 
procedures that allowed appeals (mean = 5.43); and procedures that 
consistently applied laws to particular legal problems (mean = 5.39).108 
They also valued evidence that decision makers are trustworthy.  
Authorities are viewed as more trustworthy when they give adequate 
attention to the concerns of those who appear before them and when they 
explain the reasoning behind their decisions.  Respondents indicated 
adequate consideration of their concerns was especially important (mean 
= 5.33).109 
                                                                                                                       
results.  First, scales were constructed to represent ideas.  Those scales combine the items listed 
below them.  The mean desirability of each idea is reflected in the average for that scale, with higher 
numbers indicating more desirability.  The desirability of each item is also shown, using the same 
scale.  So, for example, the mean desirability of neutrality is 5.58, while the mean desirability for a 
decision based on facts, one of the five items that make up the neutrality scale, is 5.88.  See id. 
 103. See infra appended Table 3.  “Overall procedural justice” means that people were simply 
asked whether the procedure is just.  The other four categories ask about procedural dimensions 
often associated with procedural justice.  Past studies have suggested that the four categories explain 
about 80% of the variance in overall procedural justice judgments.  See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. 
HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 76–
96 (2002). 
 104. See infra appended Table 3. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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B. Implications 
These findings support the traditional procedural justice finding that 
people care about more than just winning their case.  The finding that the 
likely outcome of a procedure shapes its desirability follows naturally 
from the suggestion that people approach wrongdoing with the 
motivation to end behavior they view as inappropriate and illegal.  
However, the ability to successfully bridge across different views 
concerning conduct in a given setting depends upon people being willing 
to use or participate in processes in which they do not control the 
outcome (and cannot be assured that the outcome will be favorable).110 
In this setting, as in earlier research on procedural justice, people 
recognized the importance of concerns beyond their own self-interest.  In 
fact, people rated having a neutral forum as being the most important 
feature of a procedure (mean = 5.58).111  A neutral forum is one that 
leads to a fact-based (mean = 5.88) and lawful (mean = 5.64) outcome.112  
It is not simply a procedure that allows the party to prevail and achieve 
the outcome it wants. 
The respondents also rated having a trustworthy authority as the 
decision maker as important to their concern with prevailing and 
achieving their desired outcome when they are evaluating a procedure’s 
desirability (mean = 5.16).113  A trustworthy authority is an authority 
who considers the concerns of the parties when deciding (mean = 5.33) 
and who explains the reasons for the decision after making it (mean = 
4.96).114  Again, these concerns reflect procedural concerns that may 
relate to, but appear to be distinct from, winning.115 
Overall, these findings suggest that respondents recognized the value 
of using procedures that have the characteristics of a just procedure—in  
 
                                                          
 110. As one of us has pointed out elsewhere, this is important to citizens’ willingness to defer to 
the outcomes of processes as well as to their willingness to participate in them.  See Tyler, What is 
Procedural Justice?, supra note 18, at 104 (defining “procedural justice”). 
 111. See infra appended Table 3. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Trust is correlated with control (r = 0.22, n.s.), suggesting that people believe they are more 
likely to achieve desired outcomes when they have a trustworthy authority.  David L. Markell & 
Tom R. Tyler, Analysis (data on file with authors).  Similarly, people are more likely to believe they 
will achieve desired outcomes in a neutral procedure (r = 0.36, n.s.).  Id.  In general, people believe 
they are more likely to achieve desired outcomes when the procedure is fair (r = 0.38, ρ < 0.05).  Id.  
On the other hand, people can see the difference between a procedure that is likely to lead to a 
desirable outcome and a procedure that is fair.  Id. 
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particular, neutrality and a trustworthy decision maker.  This suggests 
openness to participating in a process because it is a fair one.116 
VI. WHY ARE CITIZEN SUITS AND THE CEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS 
PROCESS DESIRABLE? 
The previously outlined findings are based upon people’s views on 
what they believe leads a procedure to be desirable to them.  An 
alternative approach to addressing this question is to correlate the 
existence of procedural features with desirability ratings, inferring that 
people find a feature desirable when the desirability of a procedure is 
linked to whether or not it has that feature.  This approach was applied to 
two procedures: citizen lawsuits and the CEC procedure.117 
Desirability was assessed for single actors and for large-scale 
wrongdoing.  The single-actor scale and the large-scale-wrongdoing 
scales each had the same seven items: “You would be satisfied with this 
mechanism as a way to respond”; “Using this mechanism would be a 
good way to respond to a violation”; “You would be very willing to use 
this mechanism”; “You would generally favor using this mechanism”; 
“Having this mechanism available allows citizens to play an 
appropriately strong role in promoting compliance with the law”; “This 
mechanism gives citizens a meaningful way to shape environmental 
law”; and “This mechanism gives citizens a meaningful way to shape the 
regulatory actions of government.”118  Both scales were reliable for 
citizen suits and for the CEC submissions process, with the former more 
reliable than the latter.119 
Several procedural attributes were assessed.  First, overall procedural 
justice was measured by asking respondents whether the procedure was 
“generally . . . a fair procedure for handling your complaint.”120 
Neutrality was assessed using five items: the procedure would “Lead 
to a decision based on facts”; “Lead to a decision reflecting a consistent 
application of the law”; “Provide adequate opportunities to appeal”; 
                                                          
 116. It also suggests openness to accepting the results of a decision because it is made fairly.  As 
has been noted elsewhere, it is this willingness to defer to fair procedures that is central to the ability 
of the courts to manage contentious environmental disputes.  See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. 
TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) [hereinafter LIND & TYLER, THE 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY]; TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, 
LEGITIMACY, AND COMPLIANCE (2006); TYLER & HUO, supra note 103. 
 117. See infra appended Table 4. 
 118. See Survey, supra note 63. 
 119. See infra appended Table 4; Survey Results, supra note 64; see also supra note 70. 
 120. See Survey, supra note 63. 
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“Lead to appropriate application of the law to legal liability”; and “Lead 
to a decision fair to everyone involved.”121 
Trust in authorities was measured using two items: the procedure 
would “Lead to a decision based on an adequate consideration of your 
concerns,” and would “Lead to a decision in which the authorities 
adequately explained their reasons.”122 
Respect was also measured using two items: the procedure would 
“Respect everyone’s rights” and would “Treat those involved with 
dignity and courtesy.”123 
Voice was measured using four items.  The items indicated that the 
procedure would “Provide an opportunity to present arguments in 
writing”; “Provide an opportunity to present arguments orally”; “Enable 
you to have a dialogue with the other party”; and “Enable you to have a 
dialogue with the decision maker.”124 
Finally, control over outcomes was measured using three items: the 
procedure would “Give you some control over the outcome,” would 
“Help you get the outcome you wanted,” and would “Provide you a way 
to effectively change the behavior to which you object.”125 
A. Results 
An intriguing finding about respondents’ views concerning the 
desirability of citizen suits and the CEC citizen submission procedure is 
that the features in the citizen suit process that respondents valued are 
very different from the citizen submission features to which respondents 
gave highest value.126  As shown in appended Table 4, the key issue 
shaping desirability concerning the citizen submission procedure is the 
degree to which the procedure provides opportunities for voice (r = 
0.58), followed by the extent to which people believe they will be treated 
                                                          
 121. See infra appended Table 3; Survey, supra note 63. 
 122. See infra appended Table 3; Survey, supra note 63. 
 123. See infra appended Table 3; Survey, supra note 63. 
 124. See infra appended Table 3; Survey, supra note 63. 
 125. See infra appended Table 3; Survey, supra note 63. 
 126. An important qualification concerning the responses regarding the CEC procedure is that, 
while twenty-four of the thirty respondents indicated they have been involved in lawsuits, only two 
of the respondents have used the CEC procedure.  This means the CEC procedure ratings are based 
upon indirect knowledge of the CEC procedure; namely, respondents’ expectations about what will 
happen if they use the procedure or information from others who have used it.  The lower 
reliabilities associated with evaluations of the CEC procedure reflect the lack of personal experience 
with the CEC procedure, and indicates that respondents have a less clearly formed understanding of 
this procedure.  Having familiarity with a procedure allows people to make more coherent 
evaluations of its features. 
09.0_MARKELL_FINAL 10/27/2008  4:12:32 PM 
24 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
with courtesy and respect in the process (r = 0.48).127  In contrast, for the 
lawsuit procedure, neutrality and trust were the central procedural 
dimensions.128  In the case of both procedures, control over outcomes is 
important (r = 0.42).129 
Interestingly, unlike the findings with lawsuits, overall procedural 
justice ratings for the citizen submission process are not strongly linked 
to desirability (r = 0.28).130  In the case of lawsuits, these overall ratings 
were the strongest predictor of desirability (r = 0.50).131  Why the 
difference?  Additional research is needed to understand this response, 
including the relationship between overall procedural justice ratings and 
the desirability of a procedure.  One possibility is that respondents 
associated procedural justice with neutrality—a feature of lawsuit 
desirability—and not with voice or respect.  This raises the question of 
whether, when people think about the question of whether a procedure is 
just, they may be drawn to thinking about whether the procedure is fact-
based and rule-guided (i.e., neutral).  Based upon legal training, or the 
legal framing of issues, people may not associate treatment with respect 
and dignity with the issue of whether a procedure is just or unjust.  
However, as we have noted, other research shows people do make that 
connection in practice.132  When treated disrespectfully, they say a 
procedure is unjust.133  Hence, it may be that our respondents’ prior 
judgments about the procedural justice of traditional legal procedures 
emphasize elements of decision-making, rather than issues of 
interpersonal treatment.  Again, further research is needed to explore this 
finding. 
B. Implications 
These findings are potentially important and warrant follow-up 
because, as indicated above, they suggest that respondents value different 
procedures for different reasons.  What factors are linked to the 
                                                          
 127. See infra appended Table 4. 
   128.   Id. 
 129. Id.  As noted supra, citizens have little control over the outcome of the CEC process.  
Future research to elaborate on the importance of outcomes to the value of processes like the CEC 
procedure would be an important contribution.  See, e.g., Markell, Understanding Citizen 
Perspectives, supra note 14. 
 130. See infra appended Table 4. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: 
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747–58 
(2003) [hereinafter Blader & Tyler, A Four-Component Model]. 
 133. Id. 
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desirability of lawsuits?  The analyses shown in appended Table 4134 
indicate that respondents prefer lawsuits to the degree their overall 
judgment is that the procedure is fair (“provide[s] a just procedure for 
handling your complaint”) (r = 0.50), they feel the procedure is neutral (r 
= 0.50), the decision-making is trustworthy (r = 0.45), and they have 
control over the outcome (r = 0.49).135  As was the case with the 
hypothetical ratings of procedural desirability, respondents’ evaluations 
of the acceptability of procedures suggest they are concerned about more 
than their own outcomes.136  Respondents, of course, want a procedure in 
which they will prevail.  However, they want more than that.  They also 
want a procedure that is fair.  Thus, the respondents’ views suggest that 
citizens are, other things being equal, seemingly more likely to 
participate in, or use, procedures they view to have these characteristics 
than procedures that do not. 
It is also interesting that this perspective on lawsuits mirrors the 
traditional concerns of the legal system with the trial process through 
which lawsuits are often resolved.  Discussions of the legal system focus 
upon the role of a trustworthy authority (the judge, the jury) neutrally 
evaluating the evidence in an objective, fact-based manner in which legal 
rules are consistently applied and where prejudice and bias are 
minimized or even eliminated.137 
However, it is striking that the respondents’ reactions to the CEC 
procedure were based upon very different procedural issues than those 
shaping reactions to lawsuits.  If respondents simply brought their views 
about legal procedures, derived from lawsuits, to the evaluation of this 
new procedure (which, as noted above, few respondents had used) then 
they should consider the same issues in evaluating both procedures.  
Instead, they evaluated the CEC procedure very differently. 
The two procedural factors that mattered most concerning the CEC 
procedure were voice and respect.138  Hence, respondents thought about 
this procedure in a way that is distinct from their general frame for 
evaluating lawsuits.  They focused upon whether they would have a 
chance to present their views and whether they would be treated with 
                                                          
 134. See infra appended Table 4.  Appended Table 4 shows the strength of the statistical 
relationship between judgments that a procedure is desirable and judgments about its attributes.  The 
statistic is the correlation (r).  An r of zero suggests no relationship, while an r of 1 indicates a 
complete correspondence (e.g., gender and being able to give birth). 
 135. Infra appended Table 4; see also Survey Results, supra note 64. 
 136. See infra appended Table 4. 
 137. See, e.g., THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 21, at 1 (covering “methods or procedures that 
may be used to resolve conflicts that arise between individuals and between groups”). 
 138. See infra appended Table 4. 
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respect and courtesy.  These findings are important because they suggest 
that, in some cases, a process that highlights these features may be 
effective in enhancing government legitimacy and increasing citizen 
involvement. 
To explore the importance of this finding, we need to consider the 
issues that mattered in each case.  With the CEC procedure, respondents 
focused upon whether the procedure provides “an opportunity to present 
your arguments orally”; whether everyone’s rights are respected; and 
whether those involved are treated with dignity and respect.139  These 
issues are related to the quality of interpersonal treatment. 
With lawsuits, respondents cared about “decisions based upon the 
facts”; “decision[s] reflecting a consistent application of the law”; “a 
neutral decision”; “an appropriate decision in terms of [legal] liability”; a 
decision “fair to everyone involved”; “a decision that provides adequate 
opportunities to appeal”; “a decision based upon an adequate 
consideration of your arguments by the decision maker”; and “a decision 
in which the authorities adequately explain their reasoning.”140  These 
issues are centered on the view that the decision is appropriate and 
reasonable.  They are issues linked to the quality of decision-making. 
Each of these two aspects of procedures—quality of interpersonal 
treatment and quality of decision-making—contributes to judgments 
about the fairness of legal procedures.141  Quality of treatment involves 
treatment with politeness and dignity, concern for people’s rights, and 
other aspects of procedures that are not directly linked to the decisions 
being made through the procedure.142  Quality of decision-making by 
authorities emphasizes issues of decision-maker neutrality, the 
objectivity and fact-based quality of decision-making, and the 
consistency of rule application.143 
The finding that interested citizens may value different procedures 
for different reasons also suggests that such citizens may prefer one 
                                                          
 139. See Survey Results, supra note 64. 
 140. See id. 
 141. TYLER & HUO, supra note 103, at 95–96 (Tyler and Huo considered the importance of these 
factors in shaping judgments about the overall justice in personal experiences with legal authorities.  
They found that both the quality of decision-making and the quality of interpersonal treatment are 
more important than outcome favorability in shaping judgments about the justice of the experience).  
These two aspects of procedure also are obviously not necessarily entirely distinct. 
 142. See Blader & Tyler, A Four-Component Model, supra note 132; Steven L. Blader & Tom 
R. Tyler, What Constitutes Fairness in Work Settings?  A Four-Component Model of Procedural 
Justice, 13 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 107 (2003) [hereinafter Blader & Tyler, What Constitutes 
Fairness?]. 
 143. Blader & Tyler, A Four-Component Model, supra note 132; Blader & Tyler, What 
Constitutes Fairness?, supra note 142. 
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procedure in one context because its predominant features are perceived 
to be particularly important in that context, while they may prefer 
another procedure in a different setting, for the same reason. 
It may be helpful to consider the comparison of lawsuits and 
mediation.  When mediation was first introduced in court settings, people 
did not want to use it.144  They came to court with litigation in mind. 145  
When court systems required pre-trial mediation, however, the courts 
found that many cases were resolved in mediation and, when people 
participated in mediation, they rated it as more satisfactory than a trial, 
irrespective of whether their case was resolved.146  In other words, once 
people experienced the procedure, they liked it.  This suggests the 
possibility that, although people are not asking for the CEC procedure, or 
procedures with elements that highlight procedural justice features such 
as voice and respect, they might value such a process if they used it. 
VII. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
One question we sought to explore in this paper involves the possible 
role of procedural justice concepts, as well as distributive justice, in 
creating citizen interest in using legal procedures.  Respondents indicated 
that, in the case of lawsuits, procedural influences are similar in strength 
to the influence of the likelihood that a procedure would yield a desirable 
outcome.147  For example, procedural desirability is shaped by outcome 
control (r = 0.49), but equally strongly by procedural justice (r = 0.50), 
neutrality (r = 0.50), and trust in the decision maker (r = 0.45).148  
Procedural influences were weaker for the CEC process.149  The analyses 
reported reinforce the argument that people react favorably to the 
fairness of procedures and show that these fairness judgments are distinct 
from the desire to obtain a particular outcome.  People can and do 
distinguish procedural fairness from winning, and even from having 
things come out right (i.e., achieving distributive justice).  The fact that  
 
                                                          
 144. See, e.g., Tyler et al., supra note 21 at 99–118. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 429–30. 
 147. Ideally we would be able to consider the influence of both factors simultaneously using 
regression analysis.  However, the small size of the sample does not allow for this type of analysis. 
 148. See infra appended Table 4. 
 149.  Id. 
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respondents value procedural justice features suggests it is worth 
considering these features in process design. 
Beyond this finding, which is supported by previous research in 
other settings, two of the intriguing findings from the questionnaire 
responses are that (1) respondents attach different value to the same 
procedure in different contexts, and (2) respondents value different 
procedures for different reasons—namely, individuals like particular 
features best in certain procedures while they prefer different features in 
other mechanisms. 
The key insight from these findings is that context seems to matter in 
terms of citizen satisfaction—that is, it may be that no set of features will 
be valued uniformly in different contexts and, further, different features 
will be valued more or less highly depending on the process involved.  
These findings suggest the value of targeted, context-specific follow-up 
research to develop more sophisticated understandings of citizen 
preferences for procedures. 
We believe the approach we have modeled in this project can be 
followed to assess procedural options in different contexts in which there 
is an interest in encouraging meaningful citizen engagement.  That is, 
interested stakeholders (some appropriate subset of the universe of likely 
participants) can be asked about their preferences for different 
procedures in a particular context and, further, about their preferences for 
different features of processes; policy makers can then incorporate this 
information into their efforts to design processes that will be responsive 
to these desires, in addition to considering other relevant factors as part 
of such design work.150 
We suggest it may be possible to consider a matrix approach for 
designing suitable procedures for different situations, again to the extent 
the goal is to engage citizens in such procedures.  The following matrix 
is a simplification of what we are looking for, but it hopefully is 
illustrative of the type of inquiry that may be helpful.  It reflects our 
speculation that development of typologies for at least four variables in 
dispute resolution contexts may help to advance capacity to tailor 
procedures to the interests of concerned citizens: (1) the personal 
                                                          
 150. Even in the limited context of seeking to enhance citizen engagement, this ex ante approach 
has limits.  An example of those limits is provided by the literature on mediation.  People do not 
seek mediation in courts, thinking they prefer adjudication.  If required to engage in mediation, 
however, many people find it engaging, and, overall, mediation is rated post-use as more satisfactory 
than adjudication.  However, the features that make mediation popular post-use are not the same 
features that people seek when they come to court.  Further, process design obviously needs to 
consider a wide variety of factors beyond the impacts of different options on likely levels of citizen 
participation.  See, e.g., supra note 12. 
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characteristics of likely process participants; (2) the potential clarity of 
the outcome; (3) the contentiousness of the issues; and (4) how much is 
at stake.151 
 
The Impact of Situational Issues and Stakeholder Characteristics 
on the Weight Placed upon Different Procedural Elements 
Contextual issues  
Personal 
characteristics 
Potential clarity 
of the outcome 
Contentiousness 
of the issues 
How much is at 
stake? 
The person’s 
motivation for 
taking action 
Weight placed 
upon: 
-neutrality 
-trust 
-respect 
-voice 
-overall 
procedural 
justice 
Weight placed 
upon: 
-neutrality 
-trust 
-respect 
-voice 
-overall 
procedural 
justice 
Weight placed 
upon: 
-neutrality 
-trust 
-respect 
-voice 
-overall 
procedural 
justice 
Trust in the 
government 
Weight placed 
upon: 
-neutrality 
-trust 
-respect 
-voice 
-overall 
procedural 
justice 
Weight placed 
upon: 
-neutrality 
-trust 
-respect 
-voice 
-overall 
procedural 
justice 
Weight placed 
upon: 
-neutrality 
-trust 
-respect 
-voice 
-overall 
procedural 
justice 
Capacity to 
participate 
(e.g., to make 
oral or 
written 
arguments) 
Weight placed 
upon: 
-neutrality 
-trust 
-respect 
-voice 
-overall 
procedural 
justice 
Weight placed 
upon: 
-neutrality 
-trust 
-respect 
-voice 
-overall 
procedural 
justice 
Weight placed 
upon: 
-neutrality 
-trust 
-respect 
-voice 
-overall 
procedural 
justice 
                                                          
 151. Our model matrix is a simplification of possible citizen perspectives for several reasons.  
This is an initial effort intended to stimulate refinements that will help to produce inventories of the 
types of variables relevant in different contexts, among different stakeholders, in engendering 
meaningful citizen participation.  For example, the matrix in the text only allows for evaluating 
citizen preferences for different procedures in single contextual situations.  It is possible to extend 
our model approach to develop matrices that account for different contextual scenarios taken 
together.  Similarly, it is possible to account for the importance of outcome by incorporating a 
distributive justice column in the matrix. 
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As this preliminary effort at a matrix reflects, one key variable 
involves the traits or characteristics of likely participants.  The point here 
is that different disputes involve different groups of stakeholders and, 
further, different procedures may be more or less attractive depending on 
the preferences of the particular groups involved.  The notion that we 
should consider the attributes of users in designing procedures is well 
established in law.  In the procedural due process context, for example, 
the United States Supreme Court in cases such as Mathews v. Eldridge 
and Goldberg v. Kelly has focused particular attention on the 
characteristics of participants in determining appropriate procedures.152  
As the Court in Mathews noted, due process requires that procedures be 
tailored “to ‘the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be 
heard’ . . . .”153  In our situation, the focus is on the likelihood that 
particular features will engage specific constituencies, rather than on due 
process implications as in Goldberg and Mathews, but the general idea is 
the same; notably that it is appropriate to consider the nature of 
stakeholders in designing procedures.  Thus, a typology of likely 
participants may be helpful in designing procedures intended to engage 
them.  Not much work has been done in this arena, but for an interesting 
example of an effort to distinguish among different environmental NGOs 
in terms of their interests, see Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering 
Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible 
Regulation.154  Further work is needed to begin to develop such a 
typology. 
We hypothesize that a second key variable in designing dispute 
resolution processes so they are effective in engaging citizens is the 
nature of the dispute itself.  In other words, the type of dispute may affect 
the relative importance to participants of different procedures (and 
features of processes).  Thus, again we suggest the value of a typology, 
but this time of different types of disputes.  In developing this 
hypothesis, it will be important to unpack differences among types of 
disputes to determine the differences that matter to likely participants in 
terms of their preferences among various procedures.  We offer a few 
possible distinguishing features in an effort to explain what we mean.  
We hypothesize, for example, that a highly contentious dispute may lead 
participants (or would-be participants) to prefer different procedures than 
less contentious disputes.  Similarly, participants may have stronger 
preferences for certain features in disputes in which the law is unclear 
                                                          
 152. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 153. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (quoting Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268–69). 
 154. See Seidenfeld, supra note 81. 
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than in disputes where the governing law is relatively clear.  So, for 
example, it may be that a procedure like the CEC process, which appears 
to be valued for its “voice” and “respect” features, may be valued 
relatively highly by participants where outcomes are clear.  Again, 
follow-up work is needed to explore the details of such a typology—the 
distinctions among different types of disputes that are relevant to 
participants’ preferences for different types of procedures.155 
Finally, we suggest that the type of end result a process produces 
also may be relevant in identifying the absolute and relative importance 
of different procedural justice features to likely participants in such a 
process.  If the stakes are high, for example, our hypothesis is that certain 
procedural justice features more closely related to outcome may carry 
particular importance, while less outcome-related features such as voice 
may receive a greater degree of preference for low-stakes disputes.156  
While our data is obviously inconclusive, the fact that the CEC process 
does not produce a clear outcome and carries no sanctions or other 
formal relief offers a possible explanation for why respondents especially 
valued softer procedural justice features, such as voice, for this process.  
By contrast, they valued outcome-related features for citizen suits where 
the stakes, at least in immediate respects such as the prospect of 
monetary penalties, injunctive relief, and recovery of attorneys’ fees, are 
higher.157  In short, another aspect of a matrix intended to gauge relative 
preferences for different procedural justice features may be the outcomes 
the process is intended to yield.  Because in many situations process 
design is constrained in terms of possible outcomes, these types of 
constraints may influence participant perception of the utility or 
importance of different procedural justice features.  As a result, it seems 
productive in seeking to improve decision-making processes in terms of 
their ability to engage citizens to consider the influence of possible 
outcomes on citizens’ preferences among procedural features. 
                                                          
 155. In Mathews, for example, the Court focused on the role of factors such as credibility and 
veracity in the decision-making process in evaluating the adequacy of different procedures.  424 
U.S. at 325. 
 156. Mathews also focused on outcome in the due process context, concluding that pre-
termination process is more important in the welfare context than in the disability benefits context 
because welfare assistance is “given to persons on the very margin of subsistence . . . .”  Id. at 340.  
The Mathews Court also included governmental interests in its three-part test, a factor that those 
engaged in process design obviously need to consider as well.  See id. at 321.  Interestingly, 
procedural justice studies do not generally find that people care more about procedural issues when 
the stakes are low.  When stakes are high people continue to view the fairness of procedures as an 
important issue.  See generally LIND & TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 116 
(reviewing the research literature on procedural justice).  However, here we are suggesting that 
people may focus on different aspects of procedures under different conditions. 
 157. See supra Part II. 
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We do not pretend to have fully considered the possible uses creative 
process designers may make of improved understandings of citizen 
preferences for different types of procedures and process features in 
particular contexts.  Perhaps the most straightforward use of insights of 
this sort is to reconfigure a process (while also taking into account other 
important design parameters such as cost, resources, etc.) so that likely 
users of the process are more apt to find it attractive.  We can easily 
envision other possible uses of this information as well.  For example, it 
is possible that processes may have synergistic effects, so that a process 
strong on some features may not only lead to satisfied users but also, in 
the best case, operate to enhance users’ perspectives concerning other 
processes as well.  As noted above, pre-litigation mediation seems to 
offer a possible example of this phenomenon.  Many courts require 
people to use mediation prior to engaging in litigation.158  Often, parties 
are able to settle their disputes through this mechanism and they find 
such a process, even with its lower entry barriers and lower costs, quite 
satisfactory.  Further, even for disputants who use mediation initially but 
do not resolve their dispute through such a process and instead move 
forward to litigation, the mediation experience is such that disputants 
nevertheless are more positive about the litigation experience than those 
disputants who did not first participate in mediation.159  Thus, there is a 
possibility that a process that rates highly in terms of certain procedural 
justice features (e.g., voice and respect) may help to engender higher 
confidence in procedures that lack these features but are attractive for 
other reasons. 
To sum up, how governance institutions should be structured 
remains a hot topic conceptually as well as in the field.160  Would-be and 
                                                          
 158. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text. 
 159. The benefit for the legal system lies in the likelihood of reducing the adverse consequences 
of a culture of litigation.  One of the interesting findings of the mediation literature is that, when 
people have pre-trial mediation that fails and then go on to litigation, their rates of accepting 
litigation outcomes increase.  Even failed mediation, in other words, has a positive influence on the 
long-term likelihood of finding an acceptable solution through litigation.  See Tom R. Tyler, Social 
Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 119–20 (2000). 
 160. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA 
L. REV. 1, 3, 6 (1997) (suggesting that “the language of regulatory reinvention is ubiquitous” 
because of concerns about the structure and operation of the administrative state, and that there is a 
need to focus on collaborative approaches that will facilitate adaptive problem solving); Christopher 
S. Elmendorf, Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional Courts, 56 DUKE L.J. 953, 955 (2007) 
(discussing creation of new, independent institutions “which . . . are concerned with foundational 
commitments of liberal democracy” but are intended to advance this commitment through strategies 
such as investigations, rather than traditional litigation).  Elmendorf refers to these institutions as 
“advisory counterparts” to constitutional courts.  Id.  The CEC citizen submissions process is an 
example of such an advisory counterpart.  In the environmental arena that is the focus of this article, 
there are increasing numbers of examples of regional and other new forms of governance structures 
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actual architects or implementers of institutional restructuring have a 
variety of goals, including enhancing government’s legitimacy and 
credibility, improving effectiveness and efficiency, increasing citizen 
engagement, and bolstering willingness to defer to government decision-
making processes and conform to governmental expectations.161 
Our argument in this article is that empirical governance is a useful 
tool for those interested in such reforms.  Our particular focus is on the 
issue of citizen involvement in governance, notably on citizens’ use of 
governance mechanisms intended to engage them.  If we want people to 
participate in government, it is important to structure procedures to 
encourage such participation.  People always have a choice about how to 
respond to evidence of wrongdoing.  One choice is to respond through 
the legal system.  Alternatively, they can become disaffected and 
withdraw from active governance.  They can choose strategies such as 
mounting a media campaign, waging civil disobedience, or starting a 
revolution.  On a broad scale, when people do not view the procedures 
available within the legal system as desirable and appropriate, people do 
not bring their disputes to the legal system and the credibility of our 
institutions of governance, along with the authority of the law to manage 
contentious issues, are diminished.162  Our thesis in this context is that 
                                                                                                                       
created to address common environmental concerns, sometimes organized around a common 
resource, and other times focused on larger issues.  See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers 
to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 1071 (1995) (discussing the Chesapeake Bay Program); 
Scott D. Anderson, Watershed Management and Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Massachusetts 
Approach, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 339, 377 (1999) (discussing the Massachusetts Watershed 
Initiative); Katherine Fletcher, Protecting Puget Sound: An Experiment in Regional Governance, 65 
WASH. L. REV. 359, 366 (1990) (discussing the Puget Sound plan); Errol Meidinger, The 
Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
47, 48 (2006) (discussing the Forest Stewardship Council). 
 161. These issues have been particularly salient in local courts and with trial judges seeking to 
better manage their dockets.  The California courts, for example, recently adopted a strategic plan for 
the judicial branch that is focused upon issues of justice for litigants.  See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF 
CAL., JUSTICE IN FOCUS: THE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR CALIFORNIA’S JUDICIAL BRANCH 2006–2012 
(2006), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/strategic_plan_2006-
2012.pdf.  The plan was based upon statewide surveys that identified procedural justice issues as the 
primary concern expressed by the public.  D.B. Rottman, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., TRUST AND 
CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS (2005), 
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/4_37pubtrust1.pdf.  Such a pro-
cedural justice approach has also been advocated by judicial authorities.  See, e.g., Kevin Burke & 
Steve Leben, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: A KEY INGREDIENT IN PUBLIC SATISFACTION (Sept. 26, 
2007).  Primers on implementing these ideas can be found in Tom R. Tyler, What Do They Expect?: 
New Findings Confirm the Precepts of Procedural Fairness, CAL. CTS. REV., Winter 2006, at 22–
24; JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS (2007), available 
at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/profair/. 
 162. There are, of course, limits to the role the legal system should play in resolving disputes.  
Notions such as rational ignorance and its impact on citizen interest in participation are beyond the 
scope of this paper, as is the appropriate role for extra-legal approaches such as civil disobedience in  
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empirical governance, notably systematically studying the preferences of 
likely process users in different contexts, can help us learn about the 
types of processes interested stakeholders would be inclined to use and, 
more particularly, the types of features that are likely to increase such 
participation.163 
                                                                                                                       
addressing conflict.  For an overview of rational ignorance, see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance 
at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 n.6 (2001). 
 163. As we have noted, one problem is that people may not know how they will feel about a 
procedure until they have used it.  Since very few people have used the CEC procedure, we were not 
able to evaluate whether using the procedure changed people’s views about it.  As we have noted, 
people are much more likely to view mediation as satisfactory after they have used it.  See supra 
note 146. 
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Table 1 
Desirability of Availability of Various Procedures 
 
Procedure 
 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
 
File a citizen lawsuit  
  
 
5.89 (0.58) 
Participate in government enforcement action 5.30 (1.07) 
File a common law action    5.42 (1.17) 
File a submission with the CEC   4.12 (1.59) 
File a citizen suit against the government   5.74 (0.53) 
Raise concerns with the EPA    4.78 (1.12) 
Petition the EPA to withdraw state authorization 5.30 (0.87) 
Informal contact with the violator 4.26 (1.56) 
Informal contact with the government  5.37 (0.79) 
Pursue shaming opportunity    4.88 (1.56) 
Take other action     5.04 (1.60) 
 
Note: N = 30.  Scale 1 = very unimportant; 6 = very important. 
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Table 2 
Likelihood of Using Various Procedures  
to Resolve Environmental Disputes 
  
Individual is 
violating the law 
 
Widespread 
violations 
 
Procedure 
 
 
Number of survey 
takers unfamiliar 
with procedure 
 
 
Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
 
Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
 
File a citizen lawsuit 
 
1 
 
4.93 (1.41) 
 
4.13 (1.55) 
Participate in government 
enforcement action  
 
1 3.31 (1.62) 3.89 (1.50) 
File a common law 
action    
2 2.96 (1.40) 2.93 (1.21) 
File a submission with 
the CEC   
6 2.21 (1.38) 2.36 (1.44) 
File a citizen suit against 
the government  
  
1 3.52 (1.68) 4.11 (1.40) 
Raise concerns with the 
EPA   
2 3.18 (1.68) 3.65 (1.62) 
Petition EPA to withdraw 
state authorization  
 
2 3.18 (1.54) 3.89 (1.37) 
Informal contact with the 
violator   
2 3.32 (1.66) 2.88 (1.56) 
Informal contact with the 
government  
2 4.11 (1.69) 3.86 (1.69) 
Pursue shaming 
opportunity   
2 4.07 (1.71) 4.39 (1.55) 
Take other action 
    
N/A 4.22 (1.70) 4.00 (1.71) 
 
Note: N = 30.  Scale 1 = very unlikely; 6 = very likely. 
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Table 3 
Desirable Attributes of a Procedure 
Attributes Mean 
 
Procedural Justice 
 
5.18 
Provide a generally fair procedure 5.18 
Neutrality 5.58 
Lead to a decision based on facts 5.88 
Lead to a decision reflecting a consistent application of the law 5.39 
Provide adequate opportunities to appeal 5.43 
Lead to an appropriate application of the law to legal liability 5.64 
Lead to a decision fair to everyone involved 4.57 
Trust 5.16 
Lead to a decision based upon an adequate consideration of your 
concerns 
5.33 
Lead to a decision in which the authorities adequately explained their 
reasons 
4.96 
Respect 4.73 
Respect everyone’s rights 4.93 
Treat those involved with dignity and courtesy 4.54 
Voice 4.40 
Provide an opportunity to present arguments in writing 4.64 
Provide an opportunity to present arguments orally 4.21 
Enable you to have dialogue with the other party 4.00 
Enable you to have dialogue with the decision maker 4.74 
Control over the outcome 5.51 
Provide you a way to effectively change the behavior to which you 
object 
5.71 
Help you get the outcome you wanted 5.43 
Give you some control over the outcome 5.39 
 
Note: N=30.  Scale: 1=very unimportant; 6=very important. 
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Table 4 
Desirable Attributes Related to Citizen Lawsuits and  
CEC Citizen Submissions Process  
   Single Party Multiple Party Overall 
 Lawsuit   CEC Lawsuit CEC Lawsuit CEC Lawsuit CEC 
Attribute alpha alpha r r r r r r 
 
Neutrality 
 
0.94 
 
0.81 
 
0.56** 
 
0.03 
 
0.36 
 
-0.01 
 
0.50** 
 
0.06 
Trust 
decision 
maker 
0.75 0.67 0.52** 0.31 0.30 0.21 0.45* 0.39 
Treated with 
respect, 
courtesy 
0.75 0.63 0.31 0.47* 0.20 0.41* 0.28 0.48* 
Voice 0.75 0.66 0.09 0.52* 0.26 0.41* 0.20 0.58** 
Control over 
outcome 
0.82 0.45 0.52** 0.45* 0.38 0.43* 0.49** 0.42* 
Rated 
procedural 
justice 
- - 0.52** 0.28 0.39* 0.25 0.50** 0.28 
Adj. R-sq. - - 39%** 31% 14% 45% 36%* 44% 
 
Note: The numbers shown in this table refer to correlation coefficient r.  The adjusted R.-sq. is for an 
equation that includes all of the indices entered at one time. 
Twenty-four of thirty respondents indicated they had been involved in lawsuits; two indicated they 
had used the CEC procedure. 
*ρ<0.05 
** ρ <0.01 
 
